By William Joseph Burns
Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1955 determination to negotiate Egyptian cotton for Soviet bloc weaponry thrust Egypt onto middle level within the chilly conflict within the heart East. What Egypt wanted so much, and what the USA was once uniquely outfitted to supply, used to be fiscal relief. For the Egyptian government--eager to take swift strides towards fiscal improvement yet crippled via a burgeoning inhabitants, a paucity of arable land, and a meager reserve of overseas exchange--American fiscal relief promised to function an significantly very important crutch. For American policymakers, fiscal information an incredible technique of constructing American impression in Egypt.
Few reduction relationships within the final 3 many years can fit the drama and importance of the U.S.-Egyptian adventure. This learn exhibits how the yankee executive tried to exploit its monetary reduction application to urge or coerce Egypt to help U.S. pursuits within the center East within the sector century following the 1955 Czech-Egyptian hands contract. William J. Burns has analyzed lately published executive records and interviews with former policymakers to throw mild at the use of reduction as a device of yankee coverage towards the Nasser regime. He additionally bargains useful observations at the function of the yankee financial suggestions software within the Sadat period.
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Extra info for Economic aid and American policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981
For example, at the same time the Johnson Administration suspended aid to Egypt at the beginning of 1965, it held out the promise of a new aid agreement if Egyptian behavior conformed to American expectations. The task of applying aid to fit the jumble of American objectives has been a difficult one. -Egyptian relations, at least in the short-run. But he also believed that outright cancellation of the Aswan offer would provide domestic political benefits, and he thought that rebuking Nasser would reassure anxious allies and provide an object lesson for other budding neutralists.
Stripped of its influence in the Arab world, Egypt lay exposed to foreign domination. 6 The revolutionary regime's quest for modern weaponry grew partly out of a perceived need to give credibility to an activist Egyptian foreign policy. Without a well-equipped army and air force, it was unlikely that Egypt would ever wield much influence in regional affairs. 7 Of perhaps even more fundamental importance in the RCC's thinking was the fact that the Egyptian officer corps, the only real power base that the regime had, demanded rapid acquisition of advanced military equipment.
Page 17 The Egyptian government refused to accept the MAAG. Having endured a storm of domestic criticism over the concessions made to secure British withdrawal from the Suez Base, Nasser was not prepared to acquiesce to even the most modest sort of formal foreign military presence in Egypt. In an interview published in an American periodical in August 1954, Nasser appealed to the Eisenhower Administration to understand his predicament. Because of our history we have complexes in this country about some wordsespecially those that imply that we are being tied to another country.